Cardiac arrest due to accidental overdose with norepinephrine dissolved in crystalloid. by Hansel, Jan & Ármannsson, Gunnar Skúli
1Hansel J, Ármannsson GS. BMJ Case Rep 2020;13:e237643. doi:10.1136/bcr-2020-237643
Cardiac arrest due to accidental overdose with 
norepinephrine dissolved in crystalloid
Jan Hansel,1 Gunnar Skúli Ármannsson2 
Case report
To cite: Hansel J, 




1Department of Anaesthetics, 
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust, 
Blackpool, UK
2Department of Anaesthesia 
and Intensive Care, Landspítali 
University Hospital, Reykjavík, 
Iceland
Correspondence to
Dr Jan Hansel;  
 jan. hansel@ nhs. net
Accepted 16 November 2020
© BMJ Publishing Group 
Limited 2020. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published 
by BMJ.
SUMMARY
Vasoactive agents should be administered through 
a controlled well- marked infusor pump, ideally via a 
central venous catheter if given over longer periods of 
time. During transfer of haemodynamically unstable 
patients with limited staffing and resources on site, a 
peripheral vasopressor infusion is sometimes resorted to 
as a temporary measure of optimising haemodynamic 
parameters. We report a case of accidental 
norepinephrine overdose after such practice, resulting in 
cardiac arrest. It illustrates the importance of careful use 
and labelling of vasoactive agents during the transport 
and handover of critically ill patients. Finally, we explore 
human factor issues associated with transfer from the 
pre- hospital to the in- hospital environment when such 
preparations are used.
BACKGROUND
Vasoactive agents should be administered through 
a controlled well- marked infusor pump, ideally 
via a central venous catheter if given over longer 
periods of time. During transport of haemodynam-
ically unstable patients with limited staffing and 
resources on site, a peripheral vasopressor infusion 
is sometimes resorted to as a temporary measure of 
optimising haemodynamics.1 The most commonly 
used vasopressor in such circumstances is diluted 
epinephrine, where 1 mg of epinephrine (1:1000) is 
mixed into a given amount of crystalloid, producing 
a diluted solution that can be easily titrated.2 Other 
vasoactive substances can be constituted in a similar 
fashion or as push- dose vasopressors, but such use 
is highly controversial. We report a case of acci-
dental norepinephrine overdose after such practice, 
resulting in cardiac arrest. It illustrates the impor-
tance of careful use and labelling of vasoactive 
agents during the transport and hand over of criti-
cally ill patients. Finally, it demonstrates the human 
factor issues associated with transfer from the pre- 
hospital to the in- hospital environment when such 
preparations are used.
CASE PRESENTATION
A 56- year- old man was transported to a tertiary 
healthcare facility by aeromedical services after 
a suicide attempt by co- ingestion of an unknown 
quantity of tramadol, oxycodone and oral 
morphine. Due to a decreased respiratory rate and 
airway compromise, a modified rapid sequence 
induction with propofol and rocuronium was 
performed on scene and the patient was endotra-
cheally intubated without complications prior to 
transport. During fixed- wing transport the patient 
experienced hypotension refractory to a fluid bolus 
of 500 mL Ringer’s lactate. Norepinephrine 5 mg 
was injected into the remaining 500 mL of crys-
talloid in the bag and titrated to effect via a roller 
flow control clamp. The preparation was marked 
as ‘+NOR 5 mg/500 mL’ with a ballpoint pen onto 
the transparent bag without a dedicated label (see 
figure 1).
On arrival at the receiving emergency depart-
ment (ED), the patient had stable vital signs, was 
mechanically ventilated and did not require addi-
tional sedation. A standard situation, background, 
assessment and recommendation handover took 
place between the aeromedical transfer team, the 
ED team and the intensive care unit (ICU) registrar, 
with mention of the diluted vasopressor. Cessation 
of the pre- hospital norepinephrine infusion was 
requested verbally by the ICU registrar and stopped 
by a member of the nursing staff. A new infusor 
pump formulation of norepinephrine was prepared 
as per hospital policy and started peripherally in 
the antecubital fossa at a rate of 0.02 μg/kg/min via 
syringe driver in light of the anticipated need for a 
low dose of norepinephrine to match the solution 
in the bag of crystalloid. A mean arterial pressure 
of 65 was targeted clinically. An arterial cannula 
for invasive blood pressure (IBP) monitoring was 
inserted at that point. Within minutes the patient 
became markedly hypertensive with an IBP reading 
of 230/110 mm Hg and heart rate of 110/min. The 
new norepinephrine infusion via syringe driver 
was stopped immediately, thought to have caused 
the spike. The patient remained hypertensive 
during transport to the ICU. A blanching macular 
rash developed on the front torso, extending up 
to the right aspect of the neck and head. Rapidly, 
the patient developed sinus tachycardia at a rate 
of 150/min. Glyceryl trinitrate was administered 
intravenously in quick successive boluses of 0.5 
mg up to 2 mg with no response. The patient 
proceeded to develop frequent premature ventric-
ular complexes (PVC) on the 5- lead ECG monitor, 
with the IBP reading rising to 315/190 mm Hg at 
its highest. At that point the pre- hospital norepi-
nephrine infusion was recognised by a member of 
the team to be running fully open and immediately 
stopped and disconnected. The patient experienced 
further PVCs and approximately 30 s after cessation 
of the infusion, the monitor displayed ventricular 
fibrillation and a flat line on the IBP trace. Cardiac 
arrest was confirmed, compressions initiated and 
performed until the defibrillator was available, and 
return of spontaneous circulation was achieved 



















2 Hansel J, Ármannsson GS. BMJ Case Rep 2020;13:e237643. doi:10.1136/bcr-2020-237643
Case report
After cessation of the pre- hospital norepinephrine infusion, 
the patient stabilised within 10 min and did not require vaso-
pressor support nor sedation. He received approximately 3 mg 
of norepinephrine from arrival to the ED over a span of about 
20 min and 4 mg in total, equivalent to a dose of approximately 
4 µg.kg−1.min−1. Post- arrest, the patient had marked mydriasis 
bilaterally with no discernible response to light initially. ECG 
demonstrated sinus tachycardia with no overt signs of isch-
aemia. High- sensitivity serial troponin measurements were 
within normal limits. On stabilisation a non- contrast CT scan 
of the head was performed to exclude intracranial haemorrhage, 
which was normal. The patient was extubated later that day 
and discharged from the ICU on day 2 without neurological or 
cardiac sequelae for further mental health evaluation.
A hot debrief was performed with the team involved in the 
patient’s care immediately after resuscitation. There was no 
clear conclusion as to a single cause of the incident, but several 
factors were highlighted as contributory: a poorly labelled drug 
dilution, accidental re- initiation of norepinephrine as a bolus 
by a staff member unaware of the dilution, failure to remove 
the bag instead of just stopping the infusion and a relatively late 
recognition of ongoing bolus infusion. The adverse incident was 
reported and a root cause analysis was performed at a later stage, 
with all parties from the pre- hospital and in- hospital setting 
debriefed and action plans implemented to improve future care.
OUTCOME AND FOLLOW-UP
The patient had a short hospital stay during this admission and 
was discharged without long- term sequelae.
DISCUSSION
Drug labelling
Drug labelling is a safety measure where non- compliance 
continues to be implicated in a myriad of cases of drug errors.3 4 
It is especially important to have clear labels when a handover of 
work is expected and as such adherence to good practice stan-
dards is the safest approach.5 Most international guidelines on 
product labelling state that bags should be labelled immediately 
once an injectable is added and should contain a clearly visible 
sticker with at the very least the substance name, quantity, dilu-
tion, date and time.6
A matter of some confusion in our case was the marking of 
500 mL on the 1000 mL bag, with later clarification that the 
norepinephrine was added after the first 500 mL had been given. 
Ideally, a separate infusion from the resuscitation fluid should 
have been mixed.
The opinions on whether vasoactive substances should be 
given via a roller flow control clamp at all are divided at best. 
It can be justified in extreme emergency circumstances (eg, pre- 
hospital environment where access to an infusor pump might be 
limited) only as a temporary measure before at least an elasto-
meric infusion pump, or ideally a syringe driver infusor can be 
set up.
Human factors
There was a clear failure of closed- loop communication in the 
above case. The pre- hospital diluted norepinephrine was stopped 
to begin with, until a member of the team, who had not heard 
the handover data point regarding norepinephrine, opened the 
roller clamp again after the new syringe driven norepinephrine 
was being administered, without letting the rest of the team 
know explicitly. The team leader, unaware of said change, did 
not factor the old solution into the list of possible causes of the 
hypertensive emergency, wrongly assuming that the pre- hospital 
solution had been stopped.
Communication breakdowns and teamwork failures have 
been identified as key contributing factors in the occurrence 
of patient safety incidents and have been estimated to result in 
1744 deaths in the USA over the span of 5 years, according to a 
Joint Commission report from 2017.7
Protocolised care and the use of a structured checklist has the 
potential to prevent catastrophic outcomes.8 Whereas the oper-
ating theatre environment has long since embraced the culture 
of checklists (eg, WHO Surgical Safety Checklist), they seem 
harder to implement in acute and unpredictable environments, 
where multiple time- sensitive interventions need to happen 
simultaneously to prevent patient harm.9 An essential prerequi-
site for error prevention and risk reduction in such situations is 
a well- functioning team with clearly defined roles and respon-
sibilities. We noted a breakdown in those as well in this case, 
as a closed- loop communication style was not adhered to fully 
with limited oversight over the situation by the ICU registrar, 
who was assuming the care of the patient. As the team expands 
with more stakeholders, the lines of responsibility may become 
blurred even further and this must be guarded against by team 
leaders.
Figure 1 Norepinephrine 5 mg mixed with Ringer’s lactate 1000 mL. 
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In this specific case, a simple institutional policy of discontin-
uing and discarding all fluids and medical devices from the pre- 
hospital transfer team would have likely prevented this adverse 
incident, if adherence were perfect. The question remains where 
to implement checklists and policies so as not to impede sensible 
clinical care and avoid a scapegoating culture, while maximising 
safety and preventing adverse outcomes. Strides have been made 
in the pre- hospital and ED setting in larger systems with imple-
mentation of checklists for common high- risk scenarios (eg, 
rapid sequence induction).10
Advanced healthcare systems have developed tools and frame-
works for implementing a patient safety culture, which consists 
of organisational commitment, management involvement, 
employee empowerment, reward systems and reporting systems. 
There has been a gradual shift from individual to systems failure 
identification over the past decades.11 The Swiss cheese model 
was proposed by Reason et al. in 1990 and has been a symbol of 
how systems malfunction when errors occur. The model is still 
poorly defined and understood by professionals, though, with 
great variability in the interpretation of its meaning, leading 
some to question whether it is an appropriate descriptor of 
organisations prone to errors.12
Finally, it is interesting to note that publications on misad-
venture in healthcare are quite rare outside of public coro-
ner’s inquests. Although reporting medical errors to patients 
is mandatory, no laws or codified guidelines exist on reporting 
of errors to colleagues.13 This usually takes place in the form 
of debriefings, morbidity and mortality meetings, and root 
cause analyses, which can translate to institutional memory, 
but deprives the wider professional community of invaluable 
learning opportunities.
Learning points
 ► Adherence to drug- labelling guidelines can reduce 
preventable morbidity and mortality.
 ► Norepinephrine can cause cardiac arrest in a short timespan 
at moderately toxic doses in humans.
 ► A deeper understanding of human factors and 
implementation of sensible safety nets is essential for 
improving patient care.
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